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Contemporary Marxists justify their continuing advocacy of independent rank and file 
movements in trade unions by over-optimistic readings of history. The past, it is commonly 
concluded, reveals a prefigurative model which suitably finessed can serve as the basis for 
future endeavour.  Historical excavation raises doubts about this approach and discloses that 
the concept of a revolutionary rank and file movement, and how it should operate in practice, 
are problematic.  The rationale for these movements rests on the unverified assertion of a 
fundamental structural antagonism between the trade union bureaucracy and an artificially 
homogenized membership.  There were significant differences between the philosophy, 
politics and organisation of the Shop Stewards’ Movement of the Great War, the National 
Minority Movement of the 1920s and subsequent rank and file initiatives from the 1930s to 
the 1970s. Taken together, they do not constitute a unified composite, still less a blueprint for 
any future movement.  Each was flawed, particularly by adaptation to trade unionism and 
Russian policy. All were less successful than is sometimes assumed.  Members’ 
dissatisfaction and periodic rebellion were recurring features of British trade unionism.  
However, support for rank and file movements was sporadic, uneven and temporary.  
Sustained organisation was typically motivated, moulded and controlled by the Communist 
Party. Its hegemony was far from benign and remained at some distance from Marxist ideas 
of revolutionary practice. The lessons are often negative. Any future project will require 
rupture with the past rather than its renewal.   
Keywords:  Rank and File Movements; Trade Unions; Shop Stewards; Communist Party; 
Comintern; National Minority Movement; Marxism; Economism.   
 
The question of whether trade unionism can be convincingly characterised as fissured by an 
embedded conflict of interest between the bureaucracy and the ‘rank and file’ has stimulated 
extensive debate.
1
  Rank and file movements based on that conception have attracted less 
frequent examination, although for much of the last century they were an aspect of industrial 
struggle in Britain and a weapon in the armoury of socialist trade unionists.  The idea endures.  
Discussing a possible revival of trade unionism, one Marxist argued in 2014, ‘…we would 
ideally like to see a militant national rank and file movement able to act independently of the 
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union bureaucracy…’2  A hospital nurse, criticising the devastation of the NHS, ‘…urged 
workers to join a union and build a rank and file movement.’3 
 
By the 1970s, a small literature had emerged.  It included monographs on the National 
Minority Movement (MM) of the 1920s, written from a reformist standpoint, and the Shop 
Stewards’ Movement (SSWCM) of the Great War, informed by a Marxist perspective.4  
Pearce’s pioneering essay remained the solitary overview of developments between 1900 and 
1940.
5
  The historiography was augmented in the 1980s.
6
  Little substantial has appeared 
since, indeed the last 30 years have seen inadequate reconsideration of the literature.  
Attention to the subject has typically turned on historical allusion or selective accounts which 
freight assumptions that the past contains a model which can and should be emulated in the 
future.
7
  This article seeks to revive more critical analysis.  My argument is that interrogation 
of the history of rank and file movements discloses diversity, qualifies belief in a prototype, 
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provokes doubts about their achievement, and exposes a number of issues, particularly 
questions about the programme, democracy and relationship to the party of these movements, 
which have received insufficient attention.  My survey begins by discussing the concept and 
some of the difficulties with it.  It suggests that the ideas of the early Comintern provided a 
starting point.  They were open to interpretation, the test of practice, and the temptations of 
economism; they were flawed by restricted understanding of the class struggle in Britain and 
undermined by increasing subordination of the Comintern to the policies of the Russian state.  
In that light, the paper proceeds to examine the record of the SSWCM, MM and the rank and 
file movements of the 1930s and beyond in order to explore what they tell us about these 
problems.  The article closes with tentative reflections on the experience in relation to 
Marxist approaches to trade unionism. 
 
Some Problems of Rank and File Movements 
The term ‘rank and file’ derives from the ‘ranks’ of soldiers arrayed side-by-side and 
the ’files’ ranged one behind the other in military formation. It was applied to ‘the common 
soldiery’ including non-commissioned officers but excluding officers who received their 
commission from the state.  It was extended metaphorically to ‘the following in a movement, 
as distinct from its leaders…ordinary people, those in an organisation not involved in its 
management.’8   When the pioneers of the labour movement appropriated the military image, 
they imported a vision of order, unity, purpose, discipline and power.  They also annexed 
conceptions of hierarchy and potential conflict between a privileged ‘officer class’, and a 
‘rank and file’, excluded from decision-making.  Socialists prefixed the appellation to 
oppositional movements, asserting their legitimacy and implying they represented or 
epitomised majority interests. Experience demonstrated that the epithet elided the 
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heterogeneity of the working class and masked segmentation based on skill, occupation, 
income, geography, gender, religion, politics, and consciousness.
9
  Downplaying 
differentiation could impede confronting and resolving difficulties in mobilising discrepant 
groups. 
 
Practice contradicted rhetoric.  Rank and file movements appealed to militants, socialists, 
organisers, leaders, crucial to engaging wider groups.  The Webbs highlighted the importance 
of ‘…the most active soldiers and non-commissioned officers who constitute the most vital 
element of the trade union army.’10  Historians stressed the significance of what has 
sometimes been seen as ‘the real rank and file’, branch committee members, shop stewards, 
trades council representatives, a layer which ‘…stands at a strategic point within the working 
class.  It transmits the impulses that come through the movement from its leadership and from 
society as a whole… it absorbs the influences that alter the outlook of working people and 
reflects their changing moods and aspirations.’11  Rank and file movements have hinged on 
such people.  By 1914, there was recognition they had to initially enrol ‘the militant minority’ 
who possessed the ability to activate and enlist ‘the timid majority.’12  Nonetheless, the 
terminology continued to constitute a partial and partisan classification.  It excluded, for 
example, union rebellions and independent workers’ self-activity which sometimes resulted 
in breakaway unions but could not be comfortably pressed into a militant or leftwing 
mould.
13
  The designation was reserved for independent organisation from below, typically 
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inspired or led by socialists, which challenged officialdom in order to engineer radical left-
wing innovation within existing unions.   
 
Rank and file movements emerged as a response to changes in industrial relations and society, 
to the increased size, centralisation and bureaucratisation of unions; national collective 
bargaining challenging local and workplace autonomy; incipient links with the state; and 
sharpening discontent with officials.
14
  ‘The Great Unrest’ of 1910-1914 generated 
organisations in a syndicalist mode.
15
  The Miners’ Next Step, the manifesto of the South 
Wales Miners’ Reform Committee, was infused with syndicalist suspicions of leadership and 
insistence on rank and file initiative.  It emphasised economic demands intended to ‘ginger 
up’ the union leaders, and a democratised national miners’ union.  An industrial union would 
expropriate the coalowners, introduce workers’ control and pioneer self-management across 
industry, coordinated by a Central Production Board.
16
  The Amalgamation Committees, 
largely limited to engineering, were described by G.D.H. Cole as ‘…for the most part a “rank 
and file” movement of a left-wing character, keenly critical of the attitude and conduct of the 
permanent trade union officials.’17  Mergers would unite workers in industrial unions and a 
general strike would secure possession of the means of production, distribution and 
exchange.
18
  The SSWCM leadership, in contrast, began to transcend syndicalism. The 
Bolsheviks welcomed the movement:  ‘Lenin saw in the shop stewards the leaders who 
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represented the authentic voice of working class revolt in Britain.’19  Rank and filism 
commenced to penetrate the Marxist mainstream: 
 That the rank and file of the workers, in spite of the long traditions of trade 
 unionism, are gradually becoming aware of the inadequacies of their trade 
 unions in modern class warfare, is clear from the rise and spread of the 
 shop stewards’ and workers’ committee movement.  It should be our 
 business to encourage and foster this movement…We must propagate 
 the idea of the rank and file organisations.
20
   
 
Syndicalism emphasised officials’ estrangement from members’ aspirations and the 
transformation of a restructured, member-controlled trade unionism into the primary engine 
of class advance.  SSWCM leaders contributed a sharper analysis of internal conflict and its 
resolution.
21
  From 1917, they identified workers’ committees, pursuing workers’ control, 
with soviets, recognised revolution required social rupture, rather than organic transition 
through radically reformed unions, and acknowledged the indispensability of a proletarian 
party.
22
  Syndicalism left a lasting mark; but leading stewards’ adhesion to the Communist 
Party (CPGB) ensured revolutionary rank and filism would take root in Britain.
23
  Animated 
generally by the Leninist conception of a fundamental conflict of interest between the union 
bureaucracy, an integral component of the labour aristocracy, and a militant rank and file, 
more specifically by the turn from the 1919 – 1921 assumption of imminent revolution to the 
united front, the Comintern’s ideas were crystalised in the MM.  
 
Frequently regarded as the ‘ideal type’ of a rank and file movement, the MM attempted to 
infuse the experience of the shop stewards with Bolshevik politics, bringing together 
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Communists and militants in an anti-capitalist coalition, independent of the bureaucracy, with 
its own democracy and programme of minimum trade union and maximum socialist demands.  
It liaised with the CPGB, campaigned to move union policy left and provided a forum in 
which Communists attempted to win their collaborators to Marxism.  These are essential 
concomitants of a revolutionary rank and file movement and the MM undoubtedly 
represented a further step forward.  Progress was constrained by economic downturn, union 
defeat and political problems.  The Comintern had retreated from assertions that British 
unions could be rapidly and directly revolutionised.  It remained handicapped by limited 
insight into the particularities of British liberal democracy and never elaborated a coherent 
theory of trade unionism.  Moscow demonstrated superficial understanding of the existing 
consciousness of British workers, the entrenched hegemony of reformism and the complex 
ways in which consciousness interacted with history, changes in political economy and the 
balance of forces.  Too often, rhetoric and voluntarism replaced analysis, strategy and careful 
appraisal of the factors necessary to the development of a revolutionary situation.  
Opportunities to construct a stronger revolutionary presence were confused with 
opportunities to make a revolution, as in 1926 and 1929-1931.  Moreover, the united front 
was accompanied by enhanced emphasis on the problems of the Soviet state.   
 
All this militated against a long-term, strategic conception of a rank and file movement 
operating in a non-revolutionary conjuncture.  There was ambiguity and imprecision – about 
the extent to which the MM should operate as a ‘ginger group’ on union leaders or act 
independently; the weight to be accorded immediate demands and their relation to socialist 
objectives; and its autonomy from the party.  Impatience and over-optimism impeded 
confronting obstacles to advance.  From 1925, decisively from 1929, the Comintern reflected 
the policies of the Stalin faction.  From its inception, directives, filtered through a weak, 
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theoretically impoverished CPGB, provided a halting guide to practice. Rank and filism was 
increasingly fashioned by the pressures of trade unionism and the shifting, self-interested 
strategies and elastic politics of Russia’s rulers.24 
 
The idea turns on ‘movement’ as well as ‘rank and file’.  Unions, it is commonly observed, 
constitute a combination of movement and organisation.
25
  In stylised histories early unions 
depended on ‘spontaneity’, direct action, primitive democracy, shared values, and flexible 
links between local bodies.  Despite bureaucratisation, officialdom needed to preserve an 
element of movement:  organisational maintenance depends ultimately on activism and 
mobilisation, solidarity and democracy.
26
  At a high level of abstraction, rank and file 
movements within capitalism may be categorised as social movements which express these 
tensions: in socialist narratives they assert the relevance of a past in which unions were 
democratic, fighting movements, rather than bureaucratic vested interests.  Social movement 
theory distinguishes ‘transformative movements’ aspiring to fundamentally reorder society 
from ‘reformative movements’ with more limited objectives.27 Revolutionary rank and filism 
                                                          
24
 Hinton and Hyman, pp. 12-26.  The best Bolshevik analysis, notably Trotsky’s Writings on Britain vol 2 
(London: New Park, 1974), was perceptive but sometimes impressionistic and over-optimistic. Party leaders’  
restricted grasp of Marxism and susceptibility to trade unionism were apparent.  J. T. Murphy remembered:  
‘…we were ardent trade unionists.  That was our strength…but the theoretical equipment of the leadership as 
a whole was not of a high standard…The CPGB was supposed to be a Marxist party but there were few in it 
who had more than a nodding acquaintance with the writings of Marx.’  Quoted, Woodhouse and Pearce, p. 73; 
J. T. Murphy, New Horizons (London:  The Bodley Head, 1941), p. 281.  Zinoviev’s Comintern was staffed by 
second level Bolsheviks such as Manuilsky, Piatnitsky and Safarov and increasingly demonstrated authoritarian 
attitudes.  It intermittently recommended conciliation of union leaders and wavered between viewing the MM 
as cajoling them, and criticising them – see, for example, L. J. Macfarlane, The British Communist Party:  Its 
Origin and Development until 1929 (London:  MacGibbon and Kee, 1966), p. 142.  For some of the background 
see Branko Lazitch and Milorad Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1972); Cliff and Gluckstein, pp. 42-56;  John Riddell, Towards the United Front:  Proceedings of the Fourth 
Congress of the Communist International, 1922 (Leiden: Brill, 2012); Idem, To the Masses:  Proceedings of the 
Third Congress of the Communist International (Leiden:  Brill, 2015). 
25
 Allan Flanders, ‘What are Unions For?’ in Idem, Management and Unions (London: Faber and Faber, 1970), 
pp. 43-44.  The term ‘rank and file movement’ seems to have emerged after the Great War – see, for example, 
Cole, Workshop Organisation, p.17; The Worker, 29 September 1923 (William Gallacher). 
26
 Richard Hyman, Industrial Relations:  A Marxist Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 73-93. 
27
 Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behaviour (New York: Free Press 1963);  Charles Tilly, From Mobilisation to 
Revolution (New York: McGraw Hill, 1978).  The utility of social movement theory to the subject is limited:  the 
category is elastic and embraces a bewildering constellation of very different groups. Most rank and file 
9 
 
may similarly be contrasted with reform movements based on electing militant, competent 
leaders or deepening democracy.  We can also differentiate sectional movements, 
representing one industry or particular unions, from national movements integrating 
industrial sections, which function as a national rank and file centre.  Such distinctions are 
occasionally blurred, for example, in radical circles in the USA, where the rank and file 
rubric is sometimes indiscriminately applied to union reform caucuses and revolutionary 
movements led by Communists.
28
 
 
Further confusion arises when the term is assigned to trade union organisation. Fords, we are 
told, ‘…faced a rank and file movement in their plants which in the 1950s was probably the 
most advanced in the country.’29  The reference is to shop stewards’ committees in car 
factories in the 1950s and 1960s.  Built from below, they achieved a measure of autonomy 
from the external union.  They developed informal controls and workplace bargaining which 
challenged wider agreements and stimulated official hostility.  There were attempts to link 
plants in company combine committees and connect combines in national conferences.
30
  
Captured in phrases such as ‘the real union’ and ‘a union within a union’, workplace struggle 
and the frictions it engendered provided opportunities for Marxists. The key word, however, 
is ‘union’.  Stewards were credentialed by trade unions, reported to union committees and 
represented all union members – not simply militants and socialists.  The politics of the 
majority were reformist.  Despite its militancy, multi-union basis, and dysfunctionality to 
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existing arrangements, steward organisation and plant bargaining remained within the realm 
of trade unionism. 
Cole argued in 1939: 
 There is, indeed, a fundamental antagonism between orthodox Trade Unionism  
as it has developed in Great Britain and workshop organisation.  Official Trade 
Union policy aims at centralisation – at the making of collective agreements 
covering the widest possible area and laying down standard rates and conditions… 
Workshop organisation, on the other hand, tends to emphasise the grievances  
which are most felt in particular establishments and to be more immediately 
responsive to waves of feeling among the rank and file.  It also tends to foster the 
desire for ‘the control of industry’ by putting it into a form in which it is directly 
related to the actual working conditions in each particular establishment.
31
 
 
In the light of a further 75 years evidence, these conclusions apply, at best, and episodically, 
to specific periods and particular industries.  At times, 1914-1919, 1937-1945, latterly from 
the 1950s into the 1970s, antagonism pertained between workplace organisation and orthodox 
trade unionism.  Outside wartime it was substantially restricted to the Cold War - Keynesian 
boom.
32
  In industries – vehicles, engineering, in a different way, construction and the docks 
– in which it existed, it was rarely fundamental.33  Orthodox trade unionism has indubitably 
demonstrated powerful tendencies to centralisation.  Experience confirms centralisation does 
not exclude workplace organisation. In some form, the latter is indispensable to the efficient 
functioning of orthodox trade unionism, contributing recruitment, the processing of 
grievances and the policing of agreements.  Unions participate in the management of labour 
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and shop stewards may facilitate this.  In some cases employer sponsorship influenced 
steward organisation:  at the extreme, it functioned as company unionism.  When intra-union 
conflicts became marked, the state, capital and officialdom inspired and backed integrationist 
initiatives from Whitleyism to the 1968 Royal Commission on Industrial Relations.  
Economic downturns in the 1920s and 1980s played their part in undermining workplace 
strength.
34
 
 
The essence of centralisation is coordination:  reconciling competing bargaining  
demands, meshing together conflicting sites of regulation, imposing imperfect unity on 
sectionalism.  As such, union bureaucrats have proved capable of responding to challenges 
from below and assimilating workplace organisation to orthodox trade unionism.  Finally, 
while Cole’s comment on workers’ control is pertinent, transition from workplace controls to 
demanding control of industry has been problematic; it requires a step change, sometimes 
embodied in the transition from trade union workplace organisation to rank and file 
movements. 
 
These points have been elaborated because it is important to distinguish between the two – 
and some do not.  Establishing workplace trade unionism constituted an achievement, 
although it should be remembered that from the 1960s, steward systems were developed from 
above by public sector union leaders.
35
  Taken in historical sweep, workplace organisation 
represented the completion of trade unionism, not a break with it.  Stewards’ committees 
expressed and reinforced ‘factory consciousness’, trade union consciousness centred on 
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workplace struggle rather than wider sectional concerns.
36
  Regulation of the sale of labour 
power may be conducted by lay representatives as well as by full time functionaries.  
Workplace organisation is part of trade unionism.  The same goes for combine committees:  
they propose policy for sectional regulation of wages and remain in the orbit of economism.  
Both may provide building blocks for rank and file movements.  Nonetheless, Marxist theory 
and the conception of rank and filism expounded by the early Comintern provide the basis for 
a distinction between trade union rank and file organisations which represent all workers, are 
centrally concerned with negotiating the wage-effort bargain and which are not 
programmatically opposed to the bureaucracy; and rank and file movements, based on 
militants active in the former bodies but which assert their organisational, ideological and 
programmatic independence of the constitutional machinery of unions and the official 
leadership.  They neither aspire to regulate the sale of labour power nor extend trade union 
consciousness but to surmount economism and sectionalism, not adapt to them.
37
 
 
This judgement is generally valid during conditions of routinized and institutionalized 
conflict, even in periods of accelerating militancy.  Where the situation opens up 
revolutionary possibilities then within the Marxist problematic things change.  Workplace 
organisation may drive towards broadening control over production and dual power.  It may 
radiate outwards, intervene in and intensify wider social struggles, merge with existing rank 
and file movements and come to constitute one component of workers’ councils or, soviets. 
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Progress in normal times provides the foundations for success in extraordinary times, and the 
possibility of insurgent rank and filism becoming a social movement in the full sense of the 
term.
38
   
 
A final distinction lies between oppositional movements emphasising ‘the rank and file’, and 
basing themselves on lay representatives, workplace struggle and socialist goals; and 
organisations which do not exclude stewards or militant action but prioritise officials, focus 
their main attention on winning full-time posts, on electoralism and penetration of the 
apparatus, reject in practice a conflictual axis between bureaucracy and rank and file, and 
substantially confine themselves to economism.  The latter strategy stemmed from the 
CPGB’s abandonment of its historic position on rank and filism during the popular front 
period which I address below.  The longer term consequence was the flourishing of Broad 
Left organisation in trade unions during the 1960s and 1970s.  From the 1980s, depleted 
workplace organisation saw some Trotskyist groups practice variants of this approach.
39
 
 
Theorising Rank and File Movements 
The literature reveals few recent attempts to historicize and theorize rank and file 
movements.
40
  The best known summation of their provenance is that of Pearce from the 
1950s:  
The source of rank and file movements is the conflict between the struggle 
 of the working class for better conditions and a new social order, and the  
 increasing reconciliation between the leaders of the trade unions and the  
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capitalist state, their growing integration into the upper reaches of bourgeois society.
41
 
 
Pearce admired the MM and envisaged a national movement which even in conditions of 
relative capitalist stability would be led by revolutionaries and promote revolutionary politics.  
Its raison d’être is the conflict between bureaucracy and rank and file and capital’s 
assimilation of union leaders.  But economic struggle for ‘better conditions’ melds 
unproblematically into political struggle for ‘a new social order’ so that a revolutionary 
mission is ascribed to these movements without agency, argument or explanation.  Moreover, 
Pearce’s essay assumes incorporation of the bureaucracy ensures that oppositional 
movements are always on the agenda.  There is little discussion of changes in industrial 
relations and trade unionism, of conjunctural factors and developments in the class struggle 
which stifle or stimulate their formation.   
 
One of the few expositions of their origins and trajectory from a participant was written in the 
1930s.  Sheehan argued: 
…created by revolutionaries, they come into being when the workers’ militancy 
cannot find its true expression through the bureaucratic constitution of the 
official trade union…rank and file movements are often generated around a 
particular question and are led by the most active and loyal members of the 
union [they] are the result of the inability or unwillingness of the official trade 
union machine to provide leadership in the day to day struggle so that an 
alternative leadership is created…committees elected by the rank and file 
to break the resistance of both employers and union officialdom.  So the  
trade unions can again become the most powerful weapons in the class 
struggle led by the most able fighters for the working class who will lead 
the workers, not only to partial victory over the employer but to become 
the owners of the means of production.
42
 
 
 
Officialdom and ‘the bureaucratic constitution’ of unions, permanently obstruct struggle and 
members are unable to successfully progress their demands through existing structures.  
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Embedded in this timeless discourse, which again disregards conjunctural developments in 
capitalism, is faith in members’ innate militancy and radicalism and the conviction that 
removing bureaucratic blockages will liberate it and restore unions’ original socialist mission 
to combat capitalism and direct its destruction.  This judgement is inflected with ‘golden age’ 
mythology, dashed with economism.  Moreover, one-sided emphasis on the democratic 
deficit – important as that is – may distract from the equally significant question of 
conquering workers’ consciousness. Sheehan does not address the necessity for conflict to 
move from the economic to the political plane; or the programme oppositional organisations 
should pursue, a question central to that process. 
 
Later commentators similarly relied on the antagonism between bureaucracy and rank and 
file to explain and justify these movements while devoting more attention to industrial 
relations and workplace trade unionism.  In contrast with Pearce and Sheehan, some saw their 
creation as specific to periods of accelerating industrial struggle, militant workplace 
organisation and confrontations arising from state attacks on trade unionism.  These factors 
presented authentic opportunities to mobilise revolutionaries, and attract dissident 
Communists and Labour lefts to a movement based on shop stewards’ committees.  Applying 
this to the early 1970s, Callinicos claimed: 
  It is in such circumstances that there emerge rank and file movements  
concerned to fight on the general class front and to link together workers 
in different localities and industries.  Such movements are generally led by 
revolutionaries because it is they who can give rank and file organisations the  
necessary political independence of both the ruling class and the bureaucracy.
43
 
 
It is evident from his discussion that terms such as ‘fighting on the general class front’ and 
‘political independence’ are employed loosely. In Callinicos’s estimation rank and file 
movements unite shop stewards, lay union officials, and prosecute broader economic warfare.  
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Revolutionaries provide their organisational stimulus and resources; they do not argue for 
adoption of a socialist programme in non-revolutionary periods as a goal informing 
immediate demands.  On the contrary:  
 what can bind them together is a programme for fighting around certain 
 minimal demands – against wage freeze and incomes policy, for an end 
 to the Industrial Relations Act and laws against picketing, for democratization 
of the unions and a fighting policy on wages.  In this lies the rationale for the rank and 
file organisation.
44
 
 
Callinicos characterises such oppositional formations as broader than the party, narrower than 
unions.  More contentious is his advocacy of a platform substantially similar to that pursued 
in the 1970s by left-wing trade unions – although these movements are initiated by 
revolutionaries and some of their adherents are socialists. From this perspective, a national 
rank and file movement should bring together shop stewards whose politics are sectional and 
reformist on a programme aimed at transcending workplace sectionalism but affirming 
reformism.  The premise seems to be:  extend militancy and socialist awareness will follow.  
As Lenin might have put it:  rank and file movements fight to generalise economism, they do 
not fight for class politics.    Pursuing a trade union programme entails subordination to 
ruling class ideas – not ‘political independence’ of them. 
 
Class politics unites the economic and the political dissolved in capitalism.  There is a danger 
that the division between rank and file movement and revolutionary party may reinforce that 
fracture.  At the inception of the MM, Willie Allan remembered Communists complaining 
‘…there was no room for a movement dealing with immediate and “narrow” economic issues, 
that it was a  reformist conception, and that such an organisation would…hide the face of the 
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Party.’45  The problem may be minimised if party members participate on the basis of the 
party’s programme and politics. Rank and file movements have conventionally been defined 
as industrial movements and, as such, must consciously and consistently combat  economism.  
But it is worth recalling:  ‘The Minority Movement was first conceived not as a purely trade 
union and industrial organisation.  It was, rather, intended to be a broad workers’ movement 
that would unite all left elements including trade unionists and Labour Party members.’46 
Problems of  ‘narrowness’ and economism may arguably be mitigated if Marxists organise on 
a complementary basis within the Labour Party, the unions’ umbilically-linked political 
counterpart, as the CPGB did.  A degree of specialisation is inevitable:  its detrimental effects 
may be diminished by rotation of roles.
47
 The problem may be compounded if Marxists equip 
the movement with a trade union programme; or if formal socialist objectives find little place 
in its operational policy and day-to-day practice.  It is questionable whether revolutionaries 
can justify restricting themselves to reformism in building rank and file movements.  We also 
need to inquire more precisely about their relationship to the party and how decisions 
concerning the role and politics of such movements are reached: are they independent of, or 
subordinate to, the party?  
Taking the MM as exemplar, Higgins described rank and file movements as an attempt: 
 …to bridge the gap between the revolutionary organisation and the much 
 wider layer of militants who actually lead workers on a day-to-day basis… 
 It is about how we develop the transition from trade union militancy to a 
 working class realisation that significant socialist practical advance is  
 impossible given the capitalist system.  That is what a rank and file movement 
 is about.
48
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This is helpful in classifying these movements as intermediaries between revolutionaries and 
militants and asserting that unity in action improves the prospects of developing socialist 
consciousness.  But what kind of intermediaries and how do militants move towards 
revolutionary awareness?  Writing in 1970, Higgins assumed the conditions for a national 
movement did not exist.  Three years later, Cliff claimed intensifying industrial conflict 
necessitated its establishment.  He adopted images from Lenin-describing the dictatorship of 
the proletariat – and Trotsky – more appropriately evoking revolutionary mobilisation:  the 
party is too small to move the mass of trade unionists or even stewards, so a cogwheel 
connecting them is required.  Like Callinicos, Cliff considered rank and filism a necessary 
response by a small socialist group to a powerful bureaucracy which thwarted  militancy.  
Like Callinicos, but unlike Pearce, he characterised rank and file movements as economic 
movements. Their purpose was to influence union leaders and extend trade union struggle 
beyond the workplace, ‘…but not going as far as to aim at the complete emancipation of the 
working class by the overthrow of the capitalist system.’49 Cliff’s answer to the problem of 
how militants become revolutionaries seemed to be – at least for the immediate future – 
through more and bigger strikes.  He overestimated the socialist potential of stewards and 
rank and file trade union organisation, and the transformative power of economic struggle, 
rather than social struggle fused with revolutionary politics, programme and party:  ‘…the 
rising conflict will disclose to workers the magnitude of the struggle, will widen their 
horizons and will help to clarify their ideas.’50   
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To sum up:  the early literature takes us only a little beyond the conflictual bureaucracy – 
rank and file couplet, invocation of the MM, and the importance of a revolutionary party – or 
groups aspiring to that status – engaging with militants in intermediary formations.  Later 
writing acknowledges the relevance of the state of struggle; but it does not integrate  analysis 
of the flexibility and differentiation pertaining within the bureaucracy which may also 
influence the necessity for and the possibility of, rank and file movements.  Discussion of the 
democracy and autonomy of the movement, its relationship to the party and the balance 
between pressurising union leaders through official structures and acting independently of 
them, remains vague.  Some accounts, moreover, diverge from the ideas adumbrated by the 
early Comintern.  The latter was setting the bar high in Britain where conditions for 
realisation were unfavourable through the inter-war years and where trade unionism’s proven 
ability to neuter revolutionary politics required sustained struggle against the pressures 
economism exercised in the world’s oldest capitalist society with the world’s oldest trade 
unionism.  However, some theorising exaggerates the possibilities of radicalisation inherent 
in shop steward activity, adapts to trade unionism and poses rank and file movements as 
essentially economic organisations which purvey a reformist programme. 
 
Before assessing these ideas further I want to consider in greater detail the crucial question of 
how they were embodied in practice.  I proceed to explore and critically evaluate attempts to 
build rank and file movements through the twentieth century. 
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The Shop Stewards’ Movement, 1915-1920 
The SSWCM has had a good press from Marxists. Lenin believed, ‘…we are dealing with a 
profoundly proletarian and mass movement which in the main stands practically on the basis 
of the fundamental principles of the Communist International.’51  Later writers characterized 
it as ‘…militant in its method, revolutionary in its goals.’; ‘…a classic example of rank and 
file organisation…’; and one of ‘…the key movements of the past…among the few models 
we have of a serious alternative to the role of trade union officials.’52  Scrutiny reveals a more 
nuanced picture. 
 
The wartime conditions which prompted the SSWCM’s creation were preceded by ‘the Great 
Unrest’, acceleration in strikes and union membership, disillusion with labour leaders, and 
rejection of parliamentary socialism in favour of direct action.
53
 The negative side was the 
marginality of Marxism.  The leadership of the British Socialist Party (BSP) opposed 
syndicalism and strikes, discounted trade unionism as an instrument of advance, and mounted 
no organised intervention in the industrial struggle.  The tiny Socialist Labour Party (SLP) 
was ambivalent about political action, focussed on industry and attempted to develop dual 
unionism.
54
  War, chauvinism and an authoritarian state failed to contain militancy.  Co-
option of union leaders; prohibition of strikes; dilution, (substitution of skilled by unskilled 
labour); speed-up; inflation; labour shortages; and conscription, ignited shop floor discontent 
and, in engineering, provoked the emergence of the SSWCM.
55
  Shop stewards had figured in 
the rules of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) since the 1890s.  Deputations to 
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enforce agreements and customary practice were longstanding, but the growth of payment by 
results after 1898 stimulated bargaining between stewards and managers.  Other unions 
introduced stewards, while the war effort transformed their role in negotiating rates, overtime, 
machine-manning, dilution and general problem-solving and encouraged unofficial 
organisation.
56
 
 
The Clyde Workers’ Committee filled the gap vacated by union officials.  A delegate body, 
rooted in the workshops, it combatted dilution and conscription, and demanded state control 
of munitions production.  It benefitted from the socialist culture of Glasgow and the presence 
in workplaces of SLP and BSP stewards who became influential in its leadership.  It led 
strikes but failed to oppose the war.  It was confined to the armaments sector which employed 
a fifth of Glasgow’s skilled engineering workers.  The single centre in England which 
maintained a delegate-based workers’ committee for any significant period was Sheffield; in 
contrast with Clydeside’s independence, it worked with the ASE district committee.57  One 
historian noted:  ‘Outside Glasgow, Sheffield and, for a short period, Manchester, fully 
fledged workers’ committees representative of workshop organisation and capable of leading 
mass strike action in defiance of the trade union officials were never to emerge.’58  We are 
dealing with localised movements which only occasionally exploded into action and 
exhibited limited unity:  the deportation of the Clyde leaders in 1915 evoked no sympathy 
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strikes; the November 1916 stoppage against the conscription of a Sheffield engineer 
provoked no solidarity action beyond Barrow.
59
 
 
Syndicalist distrust of leadership was sustained.  The first national conference in November 
1916 was attended by representatives from Glasgow, Barrow, Birkenhead, Manchester and 
London but few were delegates from workers’ committees.  Nonetheless, the conference 
adopted the Clyde axiom:  ‘We will support the officials just so long as they rightly represent 
the workers but we will act independently immediately they misrepresent them’; and it 
proclaimed its objective as, ‘…the furtherance of the interests of working class organisations 
as a partisan effort to improve the position of labour in the present and to ultimately assist in 
the abolition of the wages system.’60  These declarations, insisting on the need for 
independent action and linking amelioration of conditions to the supercession of capitalism, 
were important – but imprecise.  One of its leaders, J. T. Murphy, recollected that the 
movement ‘…had no programme apart from these brief statements of a general character.  It 
did not define its attitude to political parties.’61 
 
The Russian revolutions of 1917 provided a fillip.  Although the March stoppage in Barrow 
failed to spark solidarity, the May strikes in Lancashire over dilution produced action across 
England, although not on Clydeside:  200,000 workers struck and 1.5 million workdays were 
lost.  The August conference attracted representatives from 23 areas, although few spoke for 
workers’ committees.  The SSWCM became a permanent body; its syndicalist ethos and 
fragility as a mobilising agent were affirmed in the election of a National Administrative 
Council (NAC)  denied executive authority.
62
  Moreover, the SSWCM failed to extend its 
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reach.  It absorbed the Amalgamation Movement but overtures to the miners’ reform 
committees and the vigilance committees, which worked with district committees to 
pressurise union executives on the railways, were frustrated.  They believed they could 
achieve their goals by organising within official structures.
63
  The movement climaxed in 
early 1918.  Confronted with extension of conscription, a conference advised demanding the 
government accept Russian offers to discuss peace but left representatives to consult their 
members.  Opinion was divided but strikes against the war failed to materialise.  Combined 
with inability to secure solidarity action over Murphy’s victimisation, and the Midlands 
strikes around this time, the episode underlined the SSWCM’s limitations.64 
 
It was led by revolutionaries.  They did not impress their beliefs on it while it remained an 
active force.  Stressing the impetus towards control in the workshops which began to push 
beyond militant trade unionism, Cole reflected: ‘…this is not to suggest that the great mass of 
the shop stewards ever became revolutionaries or even Socialists in any theoretical sense. The 
greater part of the time occupied by their duties was spent in dealing with comparatively 
detailed points of workshop adjustment which afforded little scope for the introduction of 
revolutionary ideas.’65  It is possible, schematically, to discern three elements:   a small 
number of leaders, informed by  syndicalist and socialist ideas, who attempted to impart an 
element of cohesion and direction; the majority of stewards, more intermittently engaged and 
reflecting diverse views, whose centre of gravity was craft militancy; and a membership 
which responded defensively to threats to their conditions and status. 
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What committees there were, dwindled into insignificance through 1918. In 1919, the 
highpoint of revolutionary feeling, the SSWCM played a negligible role.  It was only as it 
parted company with most stewards that the NAC fully embraced revolutionary rank and 
filism and merged, in 1921, with the committees in the mines and on the railways in the 
vestige of a movement.
66
  Between 1915 and 1918 the SSWCM had constituted a marriage 
between revolutionaries and craftsmen.  The latter now returned to trade unionism.  The 
unions and the Engineering Employers Federation negotiated agreements which formalised 
the steward’s role in procedure.  They made recognition mandatory and works committees 
optional – an integrative concordat rendered nugatory by recession and dismissal of stewards 
from 1921.
67
  But the experience had radicalised a minority and the NAC gravitated towards 
the CPGB and a revolutionary programme: 
 The function of the SSWCM is to provide the machinery to enable the workers 
 to effectively wage the class struggle; to provide the necessary organisation 
 whereby the final overthrow of capitalism can be accomplished; to take its 
 share in the task of maintaining the revolution throughout the transition  
 period from capitalism to complete communism; and to be capable of adaptation 
 for the purpose of administering the industrial affairs of the communist society.
68
 
 
The workers’ committees would develop the struggle within capitalism and emerge from it as 
embryonic soviets.  The difficulty was that there was neither a revolutionary situation nor 
workers’ committees.  Nevertheless, ‘complete subordination’ to the CPGB had momentous 
long-term consequences.  A joint statement defined the hierarchical relationship between 
party and movement:   
 …the need for a national unofficial movement is urgent … every effort 
 should be made to secure that the control of this movement should be in the 
 hands of members of the Communist Party…the CPGB must control directly 
 the activities of the eleven members of the party taking part in this national 
 movement…it is the duty of all members to work within the movement under  
the direction of the executive committee of the party…It is the business of the 
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CP to secure that all key positions are held by Communists and for all Communists 
working within the industrial movement to endeavour to secure the conversion 
of the rank and file to Communism and the complete subordination of the  
industrial movement to the CPGB.
69
 
 
On any balanced assessment, the SSWCM had not functioned as a revolutionary movement:  
it restricted itself to trade union struggle when social and political issues were forcing their 
way to the surface.  Lenin’s remarks confused the NAC of 1919-1920 with the SSWCM of 
1915-1918.  The latter’s designation as a ‘classic rank and file movement’ is questionable.  It 
was a sectional movement, covering incompletely one sector of one industry.  Even within 
munitions factories it was substantially confined to skilled workers.  Attempts to involve 
miners and railway workers proved abortive.  The workplace committees fell short of a 
model realised only in Glasgow and Sheffield. Strikes frequently failed to stimulate solidarity.  
The SSWCM was essentially a network which mobilised on defensive issues.  Its programme 
was anti-capitalist but vague, and hardly informed its activities.   Yet the context was 
favourable:  some judged that by 1919 ‘…there seems to have emerged an overwhelming 
sense that things could and must change.’70  What stands out is the failure to take a political 
stand or pass the litmus test of opposing the war.  The SSWCM differed fundamentally from 
later movements as it engaged peripherally with struggle inside the unions and had no direct 
relationship with a revolutionary party.   
 
Affiliation to the CPGB ensured rank and file movements would be subject to the 
Comintern’s monolithic organisational credo and unfolding policy.  While the SSWCM 
rejected the necessity for coordination, it expressed a healthy concern for democracy and 
cogent objections to hierarchy and the concentration of expertise, initiative and power in an 
‘advanced’ elite.  Murphy argued:  ‘Real democratic practice demands that every member of 
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an organisation shall participate actively…We desire the mass of men and women to think for 
themselves and until they do this no real progress is made, democracy becomes a farce.’71 
Such sentiments may be considered over-optimistic in capitalist societies.  Yet they embody a 
necessary socialist aspiration to extend leadership as widely as possible, so that a significant 
section of workers develop the understanding and skills required for working class advance.  
Commending ‘centralised organisation’ or ‘the leading role of a revolutionary party’, without 
explaining what this would mean in practice, risks counterposing the Comintern’s militaristic 
conception of leadership to the SSWCM’s, which had proved equally one-sided.  Both are 
fragments of what should constitute a dialectical unity between centralism and democracy.  
Translating the shop stewards’ syndicalist notion of ‘the conscious minority’, Lenin told them:  
‘If this minority is truly class conscious, if it is able to lead the masses…then in substance it 
is a party…actually speaking that minority is nothing more or less than a party.’72  This 
evaded exactly what form the party would take, how it would unite democracy and centralism 
and how it would relate to rank and file movements. 
 
 
The Minority Movement, 1924-1932 
Modern champions of rank and filism have insisted:  ‘…in developing our rank and file 
strategy we have set ourselves within a tradition, that of the Shop Stewards and Workers 
Committee Movement…and the ensuing attempt by the early Communist Party to build a 
National Minority Movement…’73  Continuity is invoked:  ‘The model for the MM was that 
of the factory committees that had been built during the war by the SSWCM in the 
engineering plants…’74  Other advocates are sceptical:  ‘…the National Minority Movement 
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established in 1924 was not a rank and file movement…This contradicts a commonly 
accepted view on the left…’75 (original emphasis).  On similar grounds, the MM has been 
termed a ‘hybrid’ organisation which ‘…pulled together militant activists and leading labour 
movement figures.’76 
 
There was an element of continuity with the remnant of the SSWCM that became the British 
Bureau of the Red International of Trade Unions (RILU) in 1922, and was replaced in 1924 
by the MM.  They were very different organisations operating in very different contexts.   
The MM was a child of recession, wage reductions and union decline.  Redundancy and 
victimisation undermined workplace organisation and reinvigorated official authority.  
Militancy endured, nourished by the brief recovery, 1924-1926, but manifested in defensive 
official strikes.  The movement was fostered by a weak party:  in 1924, the CPGB had 3,500 
members, compared with 5,000 in 1921 – with a tenuous foothold on Marxist theory and the 
factories.  For the Comintern, it remained an epoch of war and revolutions; but temporary 
capitalist stabilisation demanded united fronts with reformist organisations on specific issues, 
while retaining the right to criticise them.
77
   
 
The MM reflected innovative thinking:  the Bolsheviks had relied on party cells and fractions 
in factories and unions.  In Britain, the Comintern concluded, a supplementary organisation 
was required to advance the united front and remedy the CPGB’s marginality.  Unlike the 
SSWCM, the MM aspired to organise across industry, in workplace and union, root itself 
among activists but try to attract officials.
78
  J. R. Campbell subsequently reflected: 
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The Minority Movement was formed as a movement of Left wing workers and 
militant trade union organisations under the Communist influence, to pursue 
a militant policy in the trade union movement, to enable the Party to make 
contact with a wide mass of the workers, thereby developing its mass influence 
and advancing towards a mass Communist Party… ‘it is necessary to build up a 
body of non-party militants around the Party, a mass workers’ organisation to 
serve as the channel of the Party’s influence…as a bridge between the Party and 
the mass and as a training ground for class struggles…’79  
 
The MM became the British section of the RILU which was itself subordinate to the 
Comintern.  The movement was bound by RILU decisions; reported to its Moscow 
headquarters; liaised with its Central European Bureau in Berlin; and sent delegates to RILU 
congresses.  It ‘…was financed from Moscow and policy was controlled by the RILU. It was 
supervised, down to scrutiny of platform speeches and performance of the chairman, by the 
CP Political Bureau.  The PB insisted its decisions should not be varied by the party fraction 
in the MM…’80  Each industrial section elected an executive and attempted to develop district 
organisation.  The conference also voted in a national executive.  A secretariat, consisting of 
CPGB full-timers, exercised day-to-day control.  Successive general secretaries, Harry Pollitt, 
Arthur Horner, Willie Allan, were party members.  Allan pondered the prevalence of 
‘Russian methods’, recalling ‘very many instances…where members of the MM have been 
treated as inferior beings and made to swallow “the line” without discussion.’81 
Unsurprisingly, the MM never enrolled a significant section of non-CPGB members on an 
active basis and by 1930 consisted mainly of party activists. 
 
The economic demands sections adopted were generalised in a political programme.  The 
MM’s ultimate aim was: 
…to organise the working masses of Great Britain for the overthrow of capitalism, the 
emancipation of the workers…and the establishment of a Socialist 
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Commonwealth; to carry on a wide agitation and propaganda for the principles 
of the revolutionary class struggle…and against the present tendency towards 
social peace and class collaboration and the delusion of the peaceful transition 
from capitalism to socialism; to unite the workers in their everyday struggle… 
to maintain the closest relations with the RILU.
82
 
 
In addition, it campaigned for industrial unions; a stronger TUC general council; the 
extension of trades councils; and the merger of RILU with the reformist Amsterdam trade 
union international.  In sharp contrast with the SSWCM, the emphasis was on union agitation, 
on ‘…bringing pressure to bear on the bureaucrats and making them fight for such a 
programme…to secure a change in the trade union leadership through the capture of trade 
union posts by more militant elements [and] to take up those immediate trade union questions 
with the leading political questions confronting the British workers.’83  There was an attempt 
to integrate minimum and maximum demands but before 1929 practice generally fell within 
the framework of trade unionism.  Despite its socialist programme, the inaugural conference 
urged:  ‘Bread and butter problems first, high politics later, is the method to adopt.’84  As one 
historian argued:  ‘…the CPGB exhibited a markedly economist attitude to the problem of 
class consciousness.  The party repeatedly claimed that experience alone would impel 
workers to revolutionary conclusions.’85  Theoretical and practical confusion ensured 
independent pressure sometimes dissolved into exaggeration of the left wing credentials of 
union bureaucrats, reliance on their leadership, and restraint in criticism.  At other times, the 
focus was on arming union members but in the crisis of 1925-1926 the former attitude 
dominated.
86
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Its leaders asserted: ‘The MM is the natural development of the old Shop Steward and 
Vigilance movements.’87  They campaigned for factory committees but with negligible 
success.  The movement was inadequately anchored in the factories and unable to mobilise 
the grassroots.  It was based on caucuses in union branches, trade councils, the unemployed 
and individuals.  The number of delegates to conferences, still less the number of workers 
they formally represented, provided a dubious index of strength: ‘…individual membership 
was always slight and at its highest point was never more than 2,000…At the highest point 
not more than 300 organisations were affiliated…out of at least 10,000 trade union branches 
existing in Great Britain…there was constant fluctuation among the affiliated branches, few 
of them remaining affiliated for more than one year.’88 
 
The MM was relatively unsuccessful in attracting reformist activists or leading officials.  The 
TUC lefts – Hicks, Bromley, Purcell and Swales – kept their distance.  A. J. Cook was the 
only leader of importance identified with it.  Tom Mann, its president, was a well-known 
figure but no longer held union office.    Otherwise it received support from officials of the 
South Wales Miners’ Federation (SWMF), and small unions, the Furniture Trade Workers, 
the French Polishers, the Package Case Workers, and the Jewish Bakers.  Its backbone was 
party activists, such as Allan, the Moffat brothers and Horner in the coalminers’ unions in 
Scotland and South Wales; Percy Glading, J. D. Lawrence and Bill Ward among the 
engineers; Jim Figgins and Bill Loeber among railworkers; and a number of fellow travellers, 
notably Jack Tanner.
89
  Respected militants, they reached wider layers.  Before 1928, the MM 
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exercised a diffuse influence – but slender purchase on the policy of major unions and the 
TUC. 
 
Changes in the Comintern line ensured MM history consisted of three phases and arguably 
two organisations.  The first stage, 1924-1926, saw the movement operate with some success 
as a propaganda group.  The founding conference was attended by 271 organisations, 
representing 200,000 workers, the 1926 conference, by 547 organisations representing 
457,000 workers.
90
  The record of the TUC lefts suggested they were not consistent militants, 
let alone centrists or proto-revolutionaries.  Their involvement in the Anglo –Soviet Trade 
Union Committee – viewed as presaging fusion of RILU and the Amsterdam International – 
combined with CPGB  leaders’ political limitations to foster illusions the united front entailed 
an armistice with left reformists.  The party omitted to warn workers of their likely 
capitulation when tested.  ‘All Power to the General Council’ was foregrounded; orienting to 
the grassroots was subsidiary.
91
  During the General Strike, its members stiffened resistance 
but: ‘The MM was unable to play any individual role…the Minority Movement did not 
function as an organised body at all.’92 
 
An interim phase, 1926-1928, witnessed intensified hostility from officialdom as the party 
applied Comintern directives to criticise leaders right and left.  An influx of recruits after the 
strike ensured that measured by conference attendances in 1927 and 1928, there was little 
decline in support.
93
  But, the movement was increasingly an auxiliary of the party and the 
harder line gave way to the Third Period as the Comintern perceived renewed crisis and the 
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‘consolidated bureaucracy’ became ‘social fascist’ agents of capital and the state.94  A 
different MM now emerged as the avatar of ‘independent leadership’, applying ‘the united 
front from below’ to assemble militants around it in a Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition.   
As mass struggle developed, the MM would establish revolutionary unions.
95
  Pollitt insisted:  
The Minority Movement is now the alternative leading national centre for the 
industrial movement of the British workers.  Those who want Mondism, class 
collaboration, company unionism can get it from the General Council of the 
TUC.  Those who want a policy based solely on the interests of the working 
class, a policy of militant trade unionism, look to the MM for their leadership.
96
    
 
 
For the MM mark two, rank and filism was the midwife of nascent revolutionary trade 
unionism.  The all-inclusive philosophy, structural stability, and entrenched economism of 
British trade unionism – as well as the contradiction of revolutionary trade unions outside a 
revolutionary situation – ensured the adventure achieved little.  Ensuing withdrawal from 
work in the reformist unions presaged terminal decline.  By 1930, the MM mustered 300 
members.  By December 1931, when the Comintern formulated plans for its liquidation, it 
represented scattered clusters of Communists whose activities were minimally coordinated by 
an embattled leadership in London.
97
 
 
The MM was, albeit imperfectly, a revolutionary movement but one which veered from 
subordination to trade unionism to ultra-leftism and achieved scant success in revolutionising 
the consciousness of significant sections of militants.  It never functioned as a piston pushing 
workers into action.  In its early years it acted substantially as a support group for leftwing 
officials. Thereafter it exiled itself to the fringes of the unions.  By 1929, the Comintern had 
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embraced Stalinism and instilled a lasting conception of how a party and movement should 
interact.  Moscow’s dissemination of the military, étatiste model of political organisation 
adopted by the Bolsheviks as a besieged ruling party in 1920-1921 ensured the CPGB, and 
MM, developed in bureaucratic centralist mould.
98
  Party activists within the MM possessed 
little purchase on its policy, non-CPGB activists less:  key decisions were arrived at beyond 
their gaze and grasp.  Until 1928, there was life in the movement, some space for meaningful 
discussion and initiative in workplaces and districts.  Thereafter, breadth and independence 
evaporated.  Supporters voted with their feet against policies they had no voice in 
determining.  It was a rank and file movement in a restricted sense - not fundamentally 
because it refused to exclude officials - but because, instead of empowering workers, it 
treated them as malleable human materiel, in a way previously condemned by SSWCM 
leaders. It was not a self-governing, dialogical organisation, training workers to take power.  
Short of wrenching them from their essential context, it is difficult to create a composite of a 
rank and file movement from the distinctive experiences of the MM and SSWCM.  It is even 
more problematic – unless we suppress differences in initiation, organisation, programme, 
politics and practice – to employ such an amalgam as a blue print for the 21st century.   
 
The 1930s and Beyond 
The new decade ushered in a plethora of movements restricted to particular unions and 
industries.  Many were ephemeral:  the Builders’ Forward Movement; the Boilermakers’ 
Reorganisation Committee; the Cotton Workers’ Solidarity Movement; the Portworkers’ 
Unity Movement; the Tinplate Workers’ Unofficial Committee; and groups around the papers, 
Print Worker and Light and Liberty in the electricians’ union.  A handful, the London 
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Busmen’s Rank and File Movement, the Railwaymen’s Vigilance Movement and the South 
Wales Miners Movement proved more enduring, while the Members’ Right Committees in 
engineering achieved fleeting success.
99
  A number of points stand out.  First, despite 
Comintern insistence on the proximity of a revolutionary situation, circumstances were 
adverse:  depression, union retreat and muted militancy characterised the years before 1934.  
There remained tendencies to challenge officials’ conservatism.  Second, MM cadres were 
central to harnessing this impetus, consolidating organisation and eliciting non-party support.  
Their original purpose was to exploit these movements to revitalise the MM.  Third, the 
Comintern revised this approach.  Rather than incorporating new movements into the MM, 
Communists would expand them as discrete organisations.  Politicised and augmented they 
would constitute sections of a new, national Trade Union Militant League.  The MM was no 
longer fit for purpose:  the League would replace it. Fourth, this project was devised within 
the parameters of Third Period policy:  Communists would revitalise their union activity by 
extending these movements as instruments of independent leadership.
100
  The Comintern 
resolved: 
 Whatever opposition movements of the workers in the reformist unions exist 
 must be utilised to create and strengthen the revolutionary trade union  
 opposition.  Such movements include the Builders’ Forward Movement, Members’ 
 Rights Committees, Rank and File Committees [and] must be utilised for exposing 
 the reformists.  All such opposition movements must be led by the fractions of the 
 revolutionary trade union opposition…Only as the mass movement develops and 
 the mass basis of the revolutionary trade union opposition is extended, will it be 
 possible to transform these looser organisational forms and to organise the  
 revolutionary trade union opposition on a direct and national scale.
101
 
 
Sectional movements, Pollitt emphasised, ‘…shall be unified under such a name as the Trade 
Union Militant League which would be for Britain, the Revolutionary Trade Union 
                                                          
99
McIlroy, ‘Revival and Decline.’ 
100
 Ibid. 
101
 CPGB, ‘Immediate Tasks Before the Party and the Working Class:  Resolution of the Central Committee 
January 1932’, Communist Review, June-July 1931, p. 61; CPA Reel 25, Executive Committee of the Communist 
International, Presidium 29 December 1931. 
35 
 
Opposition.  That is the perspective…’102  Progress was slow.  Based on Transport and 
General Workers Union garage branches, but with its own committee, funds, officials and 
paper, the London Busmen’s Movement enjoyed the greatest success.  It led strikes, restored 
wage reductions and challenged speed-up.  It achieved control of the constitutional body, the 
Central Bus Council; elected delegates to TGWU conferences; secured a seat on the union’s 
executive; and fended-off official hostility personified by general secretary, Ernest Bevin.  
Adopting a platform of trade union demands, Busman’s Punch blended industrial matters 
with Communist politics but the movement experienced the pull of economism and its 
leaders came under fire for restraining strikes.  A joint enterprise with non-party militants, it 
benefitted from assistance from CPGB full-timers, Emile Burns and George Renshaw, and 
the Communist-controlled Labour Research Department (LRD).  Its strength was that it 
represented a homogenous group, limited to one locality with a common employer and 
workplace branches.  A correlative weakness was that it never embraced London 
tramwaymen, tube workers, or passenger transport workers outside the metropolis.  It was a 
fractional sectional movement.
103
 
 
The Vigilance Movement, in contrast, enrolled railworkers nationally.  It concentrated on 
organisation in the depots, national conferences and a regular paper, the Railway Vigilant, 
which focussed on industrial matters but purveyed the Communist line.  Like the busmen’s 
committee, the movement was based on economic demands:  it engaged Labour and ILP 
supporters but was serviced by Renshaw and the LRD.  It proved unable to lead strikes and 
evolved as a ‘ginger group’.  It represented a fraction of the industry’s 600,000 workers and 
1,000 union branches.  At its zenith, its 1934 conference attracted 55 delegates from the 
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National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) and 26 from branches of ASLEF the drivers’ union, 
with 63 delegates from the depots.  Nonetheless, it played some part in pushing officials 
towards a firmer stance which by mid-decade yielded restoration of the wage cuts.
104
    
 
The grouping around the South Wales Miner, edited by Arthur Horner, was formed after 
pressure from the CPGB Political Bureau (PB).  It confined itself largely to economic 
demands, influenced the drive against company unionism and took a leading role in boosting 
union membership, democratising the union and electing Horner president.
105
  The CPGB 
controlled the United Mineworkers of Scotland; otherwise rank and filism was absent from 
Britain’s coalfields.  The Engineers’ Rank and File Movement, launched in 1931, remained a 
paper organisation. When its founders were expelled from their unions they animated the 
Members’ Rights Committees which secured reinstatement.  Attempts to establish a broader 
campaign faltered, and in 1933 the committees collapsed.
106
  PB endeavours to foster a 
movement encompassing engineering proved unfruitful.  Cadres were daunted by the task, in 
a disparate sector which employed up to 1.5 million workers; some perceived inner-union 
activity as more rewarding.  The only progress came in aircraft production.  By 1935 an 
Aircraft Shop Stewards National Council (ASSNC) had been created, together with a paper, 
New Propellor, an initiative indebted to CPGB full-timer, Peter Zinkin.
107
 
 
These bodies were inaugurated and dominated by the CPGB and monitored by the 
Comintern.
108
  Until 1934, the perspective continued to be that which had driven the 
establishment of the MM: rank and file organisations ‘…cannot realise their full power so 
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long as they remain sectional, separate and limited in their scope and character.’109  Pollitt 
stressed:  ‘We cannot have the perspective that year after year these movements can go on 
without being coordinated, without being unified.’110  From Spring 1933, the Militant Trade 
Unionist was published to pave the way for the Trade Union Militant League.  Edited by 
Mann, the paper had ‘…the central political objective of developing the rank and file 
movements and working for their combination into a revolutionary trade union opposition.’111  
Like the MM, it would be dedicated to the destruction of capitalism.
112
  Succeeding months 
saw efforts to launch movements in engineering and coal as a prelude to their national 
integration.  By July 1934, failure was on the cards and the Militant Trade Unionist folded. 
By December, Moscow was pronouncing:  
…it is necessary to give up at present the idea of development on a national scale of 
the Trade Union Militant League.  Such an organisation, such a project at present 
would act as a barrier to the work in the reformist unions…We proposed to create a 
Trade Union Militant League at the last Congress.  Today it would be a mistake to 
bring it forward as a means to coordinate the militant organisations…we have no 
basis in the unions for this.
113
 
 
The Comintern guillotined revolutionary rank and filism.  Organisation would continue in 
fragmented fashion, not as a national movement, striving to connect immediate demands to 
the ultimate goal of revolution.  The causes were twofold.  The environment remained 
recalcitrant.    Developing rank and filism was a formidable, enterprise for a fragile party with 
5,500 members.  Ironically, the depression and union membership bottomed in 1932-1933 
and the balance of forces after 1934 became more favourable.
114
  Yet the departure in Russian 
foreign policy was the decisive factor:  Hitler’s assumption of power motivated a return to the 
united front.  This was followed through 1935 by moves towards a popular front with the 
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anti-fascist bourgeoisie, franked at the Seventh Comintern Congress.  The new politics 
corroded Communist conceptions of rank and filism and by 1935, required rupture with the 
past.  Social fascist leaders metamorphosed into potential allies.  Rank and file movements, 
certainly on a national scale, became potential impediments to their cultivation.   Popular 
frontism exploited fatigue with toil outside union legality and the allure of work in official 
structures, capturing, rather than outflanking, the apparatus.
115
 
 
The South Wales Miner was jettisoned in the run-up to Horner’s elevation to the presidency 
and the movement faded away.  The reformed SWMF, it was claimed, was itself a rank and 
file movement and Communist ascendancy rendered oppositional organisation redundant.
116
  
The Railway Vigilant suspended publication at the end of 1935 and the movement 
disintegrated as CPGB activists campaigned for official posts in the NUR and ASLEF.
117
  
The absence of any general prohibition was signalled by the growth of the ASSNC. But it 
emphasised its economic platform and agency in building trade unionism and conciliated 
union leaders over a threatened national strike of aircraft workers.  The expansion of the 
sector and its economic and political importance encouraged militancy and maintained 
Comintern interest. The New Propellor combined industrial coverage with popular front 
politics and adulation of Russia.  But the ASSNC was a combine committee seeking to 
develop union workplace organisation, not a revolutionary rank and file movement. In 
engineering generally, the emphasis turned towards winning official positions with the focus 
on the AEU.
118
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Popular frontism stimulated stabs at theorising practice:  unofficial organisation disrupted 
‘unity’ – when party objectives could be achieved constitutionally.  The busmen’s movement 
was essentially ‘a conference of branch officials’ and, thus, ‘an official movement.’119  
Ahistorical casuistry sanctioned selective maintenance of sectional movements, augmented 
from 1935 by organisation around the New Builders Leader.
120
  Reality intruded:  in the 
aftermath of the 1937 ‘Coronation Strike’, Bevin attacked the busmen’s movement.  Its 
leaders, Bill Jones and Bert Papworth, were expelled from the TGWU and others barred from 
office.  The PB’s response distilled the new approach:  ‘we recommend the Rank and File 
Movement should be liquidated and that very careful consideration should be given as to 
whether the Busman’s Punch is produced in the future so as to avoid an extension of the 
policy of expulsion.’121 
 
The 1930s represented a watershed.  Rank and file movements started from, and remained 
circumscribed by, the contours of capital, and functioned as pressure groups on officialdom.  
Remaining ‘sectional, separate and limited in scope and character’, beginning and ending 
with militant trade unionism, they were ‘unable to exercise their full power.’122  That 
demanded a democratic, national movement with a programme which endeavoured to 
transform trade union consciousness into class consciousness.  Imperfectly expressed in the 
MM, that conception was lost in the popular front turn to reformist trade unionism.  An 
approbatory account concludes:  ‘History never repeats itself but these unofficial movements 
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are still relevant today.’123  Concurrence requires a caveat:  the lessons are only positive if 
judged by trade union rather than socialist criteria. 
 
Subsequent history underlines the point.  During the CPGB’s ‘imperialist war’ interregnum 
between 1939 and 1941, the ASSNC mutated into the Engineering and Allied Trades Shop 
Stewards’ National Council (EATSSNC) and mirrored party policy.  After Hitler invaded the 
Soviet Union, the EATSSNC discouraged strikes, convened conferences on production ‘to 
assist the officials’ and backed the war effort, championing steward organisation as an 
instrument of progressive managerialism.  In the post-war years the New Propellor became 
the Metal Worker.  The EATSSNC campaigned for improved conditions and endorsed strikes 
while eschewing independent initiatives.  It was phased out from 1959, when activists 
attracted antagonism from union leaders, and the paper expired in 1963.
124
  Directed by 
CPGB stalwarts, the EATSSNC possessed neither democratic machinery nor local 
organisation; it was the shadow of a rank and file movement and had little to do with 
revolution.  The same went for the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions 
(LCDTU) initiated in the late 1960s.  It disavowed rank and filism and functioned as an 
adjunct of the party, executing its Broad Left policy.  It was controlled by a committee which 
worked with the CPGB industrial department and drafted declarations put to sporadic 
conferences for acceptance or rejection.  From 1969 to 1973, the LCDTU enjoyed success in 
mobilising militants and stimulating strikes against anti-union legislation but thereafter 
exercised negligible influence.
125
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Communist abandonment of revolutionary politics encouraged the Trotskyists to fill the gap.  
In 1943, the Workers International League (WIL) took advantage of a weak revival of the 
Clyde Workers’ Committee to set up the Militant Workers’ Federation (MWF) on a 
programme of economic demands and workers’ control of industry.  The WIL had around 
150 members. Despite collaboration with ILP activists, recruitment in armaments factories 
and engagement with strikes, usually from the outside, the MWF failed to profit from 
Stalinist enthusiasm for the war.
126
  In the late 1950s, the group that became the Socialist 
Labour League convened a National Rank and File Conference.  The League subsequently 
changed tack and proclaimed the All Trade Union Alliance as ‘…the political arm of the 
League in the trade unions…a training ground and preparation for League membership.’127  A 
final abortive attempt to form a National Rank and File Movement (NRFM) came from the 
International Socialists (IS) in 1974.  This group had created a network of rank and file 
papers, in one or two cases with sizeable supporting caucuses.  But IS had only 3,000 
members, slender purchase in factories and unions, and little organic relationship with the 
working class.  The Organising Committee was created and dominated by IS members:  they 
insisted on a programme of economic demands and opposed committing the embryonic 
movement to nationalisation of industry under workers control as inappropriately political.  
Its official obituarist concluded: ‘…the NRFM was still born.’128 
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Reflections  
A socialist historian summarized the early 1920s: ‘… there was very considerable discontent, 
at times even hatred, of union officials and union policy.  The problem was that the 
passionate outbursts were prone to be transitory.  Disgruntled workers after making a protest 
would sink back into apathy.  It became exceedingly difficult to sustain a rank and file 
organisation, particularly with a shortage of finance and facilities.’129  This is a reasonable 
assessment of the inter-war years as a whole. In most cases, rebellion rapidly subsided.  In 
some instances, the CPGB supplied the resources for enduring organisation.  Unsurprisingly, 
it reflected the party’s changing ideas and shifts in policy dictated diversity.  Rank and filism 
demanded mobilisation to impel the bureaucracy to lead and, if this proved unforthcoming, 
independent action.  Different movements practised this in different ways. The SSWCM 
acted as an economistic network: based in the workplace, independent of the apparatus, the 
accent was on outflanking officialdom.  The MM was part of a hierarchical, international 
organisation, a section of RILU with a stronger socialist programme.  It was autonomous of 
the union bureaucracy but not the bureaucratic centralist party.  The MM oscillated between 
pressurising the apparatus and rejecting pressure as reformist, between economism and ultra-
leftism.  It was unsuccessful in galvanising officials or mobilising independently.  The 1930s 
movements were sectional pressure groups.  Subsequent initiatives were party fronts.  
Trotskyist incursions achieved little.  None of this provides an unproblematic conception of a 
rank and file movement and it is difficult to portray as a success.  The dependence of the 
interwar movements on what became a Stalinist party indicated the brittleness of workers’ 
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aspirations to rank and file organisation.
130
  These bodies led few struggles after 1918 and 
failed to turn reformists into revolutionaries in significant numbers.   
 
Yet faith in rank and file movements remained resilient.  Pearce concluded his 1959 survey 
by endorsing their current relevance.  During the ‘Keynesian boom’, socialists dreamt of 
‘…the formation of a “National Minority Movement.”’131  21st century Marxists detected 
revival:  ‘In the post, health and rail, the embryos of a new rank and file movement are 
beginning to develop’.132  Others maintained:  ‘The best example in history of a rank and file 
organisation is the Minority Movement…It was formed in a period similar to today…The 
same thing could be done today.’133  These statements neglect proper appraisal of past and 
present.  They are based on exaggeration and decontextualisation, peeling away the CPGB 
from movements it moulded, adding caveats about Stalinism – and pronouncing the result an 
essentially healthy endeavour, worthy of  emulation.  Despite the difficulties revolutionaries 
confronted, the MM was part of a novel, confident, global project in what Marxists 
considered an epoch of war and revolutions, with the working class moving towards 
socialism.  That no longer applies.  Decades of defeat have seen transformations within 
capitalism; the collapse of the Soviet Union; the decline of social democracy; a working class 
restructured by economic, technological and cultural innovation; erosion of trade unionism, 
socialist ideas, and revolutionary agency.  Positive lessons relevant to the contemporary 
world cannot be culled from the 1920s in such a simplistic manner.   
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If ‘…ransacking the early history of the Communist Party for precedents’134 is misguided, 
probing the past may stimulate critical thinking.  A fundamental question is whether rank and 
file movements remain relevant. No national movement has proved viable since the MM.  
The last attempt, essayed in the 1970s in what its promoters judged more favourable 
conditions than those prevailing in the 1920s, never got off the ground.  Historians cannot 
anticipate how the 21
st
 century will unfold.  However, as a Marxist scholar recently observed:  
‘…one need not be a prophet to forsee that the need for the revolutionary salvation of the 
world will arise again.’135  More immediately, and despite the persistent tribulations of 
capitalism, forces capable of driving a revival of trade unionism are far from apparent.  In the 
longer term, the waning of traditional forms of collective organisation may liberate space for 
insurgent movements in the workplace and beyond.  In that light, and in the interests of 
enriching the political memory of the working class embodied in its activists, a few tentative 
observations may be hazarded. 
 
It seems reasonable to conclude that resort to rank and file movements should be contingent 
on the condition of union democracy and the state of the class struggle. Elsewhere, I have 
discussed in detail the inability of theories of a conservative bureaucracy containing a 
militant rank and file to satisfactorily explain problems rooted in trade unionism itself.
136
  An 
erroneous theory underpins erroneous assumptions that rank and file movements are a  
necessity or typically desirable, rather than a conjunctural, tactical issue. The evidence 
suggests that when socialists are strong, they can build at the base, penetrate the union 
machine, and influence policy.  Failure has owed as much to the left’s political weakness as 
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to bureaucratic manipulation.  Too ready a recourse to rank and file organisation can 
constitute an over-reaction.  It is not an end in itself. Official structures remain the primary 
arena - a view to be reconsidered when distortions of democracy impede all efforts.  The 
democratic deficit varies from period to period and union to union.  Independent initiatives 
may be imperative in the face of bureaucratic blockages, corruption, bans and proscriptions; 
such factors are less relevant at other times.  There is a danger that when most workers 
reserve legitimacy for trade unions, rank and file movements, particularly of a semi-
permanent nature, segregate revolutionaries, isolate them from mainstream activity and 
diminish support.   
 
The judgement that such movements are only realisable when capital and the state confront 
militant workplace trade unionism is not definitive.  Other situations may arise – where the 
working class is in retreat and resistance is stifled by restrictions on democracy. The modest 
upsurge of the early 1930s was noted earlier.  What seems essential is that they emerge from 
mass struggle; not from proclamations, based on magnification, which announce the birth of 
paper organisations and invite non-party activists to join them.  Substitutionism is a perennial 
problem:  a significant corpus of militants willing to collaborate with revolutionaries is 
indispensable.  Its absence portends a party front.  A revolutionary presence incarnated in a 
party with real influence in the unions, the working class, and society generally, is equally 
necessary – as the frustrated projects of marginal groups affirm.  The dictum ‘it is never too 
soon to start’ has bred impatience and limited achievement.  Like other Marxist thinkers, 
Trotsky was an advocate of establishing ‘…in all possible instances independent militant 
organisations corresponding more closely to the tasks of mass struggle’, and refusing to await 
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ideal conditions.
137
    The history of rank and filism - and Trotskyism - suggest some sense of 
proportion is required.  It is important to distinguish organisations which relate peripherally 
to the working class from those which relate to it organically, having assembled a meaningful 
social base and strategic political programme so that they possess the potential to develop 
into a mass party.
138
 
 
The united front was fundamental to the theory of rank and file movements.  The tactic 
prescribed agreements with reformist leaders:  the MM was not the united front, simply a step 
towards it.  The purpose was to strengthen mass action, while simultaneously seeking to 
persuade militants of the validity and viability of the party’s programme.  It is difficult to 
envisage this being achieved if revolutionaries invert Marxism, restrict themselves to 
reformist demands and insist rank and file movements fight the effects of the system, rather 
than trying to change it.  The problem is not resolved by relying on struggle over immediate 
demands to transform trade union consciousness. This is not to diminish the role economic 
struggle can play.  Strikes provide favourable conditions for learning:  for most workers they 
teach the need for strong trade unionism.  Nor is it intended to devalue their importance in 
organising workers, constructing solidarity, building power and providing openings for 
socialists.  It is simply to reflect that political conversion is rarely accomplished without 
sustained political argument and education conducted by a strong party.
139
  Fusion of action 
and ideological struggle requires that dialogue and debate are embedded in the movement’s 
DNA.  Both action and political engagement necessitate the fullest democracy.  These are the 
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mechanisms through which a Marxist party confronts reformism and conducts its business in 
a rank and file movement.   
 
Alliances of reformists and revolutionaries for mutually agreed ends, rank and file 
movements should logically be independent of both reformist and revolutionary parties.  
Beyond mavericks, it is difficult to see why centrists and reformists who are unprepared to 
join a revolutionary party should ab initio embrace its policies on any significant scale.  It is 
equally difficult to comprehend why revolutionaries who understand the process of political 
transformation should seek to pre-empt and potentially endanger it by foisting their 
programme on a joint enterprise at its inauguration.  The movement should be autonomous:  
it should develop its own programme and its own democratic integrity but remain a site of 
political contention in which party members take a leading role, through political persuasion, 
not through imposition and administrative methods.  The unity between this approach and the 
struggle to transcend trade union consciousness and convince reformists of the salience of a 
socialist programme will be apparent.   
The aspiration is a mission statement which inserts immediate demands in an itinerary which 
culminates in a political destination.   The MM platform provides a starting point:  it 
enshrined the overthrow of capitalism and a socialist system as the ultimate goal but referred 
more specifically to ‘revolutionary class struggle’ and ‘the delusion of peaceful transition.’140  
Allowing for different conditions, it seems reasonable that revolutionaries should advocate 
something similar but the problem of realisability cannot be avoided.  Joint ventures require 
negotiation and sometimes compromise.  It is impossible to be overly prescriptive here:  
leadership entails judgement in specific circumstances on how far to diverge from the ideal to 
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ensure practical progress.  But even in propitious conditions there should be no question of 
subordinating the movement organisationally to the party, or dictating a particular 
programme – as distinct from campaigning for it.  Outcomes cannot be guaranteed.  What 
appears clear is that a movement limited to trade union horizons will reinforce trade unionism.  
Programmes, of course, remain academic if uninformed by a political strategy which grasps 
the movement of capitalist economy and the trajectory of the bourgeoise and the working 
class.  The history of the Comintern provides a cautionary tale. 
Organisation on these lines largely dissolves disputation about the involvement of left 
officials.  Those who refuse to endorse and act on these principles will enjoy ephemeral 
tenure as members.  The critique of Broad Leftism relates to its one-sided approach.  The 
problem is not so much electoralism as short-cut, opportunist conceptions of electoralism.  
Pursuit of union positions is pertinent when articulated with wider strategy based on a 
socialist platform, answerable to a significant base, and guided by a healthy party.  These 
conditions cannot be conjured up from above.  In specific situations Broad Left caucuses may 
offer a forum in which to develop political argument and assert the importance of grassroots 
organisation.  The question of ‘alliances’ with officials who are not prepared to openly 
support rank and file movements also demands attention.  From the TUC lefts of the 1920s to 
leaders such as Jones and Scanlon in the 1970s, CPGB history was studded with diplomatic 
‘alliances’.  They were, at best, one-sided and typically conducted on union leaders’ terms.  
The CPGB contributed electoral mobilisation, legitimisation and suppression or dilution of 
criticism – garnering goodwill but minimal political reciprocation.  There were no formal 
compacts or understandings of any precision.  This approach proved unproductive and 
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inimical to building a strong movement.
141
 Finally, if significant anti-capitalist mobilisations 
do emerge, they are likely to develop across society, in the Labour Party as well as the trade 
unions – to which it is inextricably linked.  This suggests the importance of a revolutionary 
current inside the Labour Party co-ordinated with organisation in industry. 
 
What should be integral aspects of rank and filism were marginalised and distorted in what 
some consider its heroic age.  Bureaucratic centralism and Stalinism circumscribed politics 
and practice.  Few would disagree with Pearce’s diagnosis of ‘…the fatal consequences of 
allowing the Communist Party to get control of such movements.’142  Yet some of the 
weaknesses the CPGB contributed linger today in the commandiste organisation, opportunist 
politics and cultic practice of groups which presently espouse rank and filism.  There is a 
contradiction between an undemocratic regime and economistic practice, and rank and file 
movements conceived and constructed as participatory democratic organisations which 
transcend trade unionism.  A range of Marxists have remarked on the continuing relevance of 
Lenin’s devastating anatomisation of economism to Britain.143  Yet the approach Lenin 
excoriated so convincingly continues to thrive.  Post, for example, commends Meiksins 
Wood’s affirmation of the socialist potential of all labour struggles: 
 …it is profoundly misleading to impose a rigid discontinuity between the ‘lesser 
 forms of ‘merely’ economic struggle and more directly political assaults on the 
capitalist order, not only because the larger struggles have always grown organically 
out of the smaller oppositions, but more fundamentally because both are rooted in the 
essential antagonism of interest between capital and labour.  There is, in other words, 
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no clean caesura, either historically or structurally, between these forms of 
opposition.
144
 
 
  The assertion is supported by examples of frustrated economic struggles leading, not to 
revolutionary politics, but to reformism; and the injunction that ‘…we should not 
underestimate the number of instances in which the capitalist order as a whole has been 
powerfully challenged by workers’ movements, even if the challenge has ultimately failed – 
as in Italy and Germany after the First World War.’145  Conflating different forms of struggle, 
listing cases which confirm the limits of economism, and citing unsuccessful revolutionary 
challenges hardly makes a convincing case.  Few would deny that under specific conditions 
trade union struggle may develop into political struggle; or that ‘lesser’ and ‘larger’ struggles 
are both rooted in ‘antagonism of interest between capital and labour’.  The point, surely, is 
that ‘lesser’ economic struggles against capital only become ‘larger’ political struggles 
against capitalism when workers’ perceptions of what ‘antagonism of interest’ means 
qualitatively shift.  This entails going beyond belief that ‘my employer is my enemy’ to 
conviction that ‘my employer is part of an antagonistic class’ and further, grasping that a 
different society is desirable and possible but can only be attained through organised 
revolutionary struggle.  That is the difference between ‘lesser’ and ‘larger’ struggles.  There 
is discontinuity between reformist and revolutionary consciousness and action.  There is 
disjuncture.  That is not only the conclusion of the classical Marxists but the verdict of 
history.
146
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The legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin turns on the necessity of class politics; it has found 
inadequate resonance in the theory and practice of rank and file movements.
147
  They will 
only play a future role if their programme and practice combines appreciation that trade union 
struggle is essential but insufficient.  Without conscious political intervention it will fail to 
develop working class commitment to the revolutionary imperative.  The early CPGB 
grasped this, although it did not always act on its implications: ‘The Communist Party has on 
all occasions assisted in the development of the movement and will continue to do so…at the 
same time it warns those active workers who participate that only a revolutionary communist 
struggle can serve to achieve the objectives they have in view.’148 
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